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Attention: MRS MULLETT

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Department of State
Executive Secretariat

JUN 19 1972

~~WH/PRD~~ or PW

Memorandum for: Mrs. Jeanne Davis, White House

Subject: Statement by Secretary Rogers in Support of the SALT Agreement

Attached is a draft of the statement to be made by Secretary Rogers to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

John S. Brims
Deputy Director for Operations

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By kbh NARA, Date 12/28/98

June 19, 1972

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
IN SUPPORT OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS
TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

I

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to appear before you in support of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded at the Moscow Summit.

In his letter to the Senate of June 13 transmitting my report and its enclosures, the President urged your support so that the two agreements can be brought into force as soon as practicable. These agreements are important not just for our people; they are important for all peoples. They are important not only for the achievements they represent, but also for the opportunities they present. Strategic arms limitation is not a one-time effort but a continuing process.

These agreements are a significant achievement.

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They constitute an unprecedented step in controlling strategic arms. They are tangible evidence that both sides are moving into an era of negotiation. The two sides now have an important investment in cooperation which they are not likely to risk lightly. The US and the Soviet Union have thus indicated a recognition that their relations can be improved by cooperation in some areas even though there remain important differences in some others.

This success in SALT recognizes that global security is interdependent, and that unconstrained weapons competition is contrary to the interests of the nuclear powers and of the world.

II

During the SALT negotiations over the last two and a half years we have kept in mind the need for wide support, both nationally and internationally, for any agreements reached. To that end the Administration has

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closely consulted the Congress. We have also regularly consulted with our Allies.

I trust there will be wide support for these agreements. The Administration welcomes this opportunity to consider them with you. We are especially pleased to know that the Congress plans full consideration of these two documents, both with officials of the Executive Branch and with the public. This is a process that is fundamental to our American system. It will, I believe, broaden the base of understanding and support for what has been achieved, and will assist in the search for additional strategic arms limitations.

III

Let me place the SALT agreements in broad perspective.

When this Administration entered office early in 1969, we faced a strategic situation in which the USSR was engaged in a broad and dynamic buildup of its strategic offensive missile launchers. It was clear that

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a rough balance in strategic forces as between the US and the Soviet Union was approaching. However, there was not then--and there is not now--any question but that the US could and would maintain strategic forces adequate to meet its security requirements, second to none. As President Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy Report of February 1970, "both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance." The President further noted that any Soviet attempt to obtain a large advantage "would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless."

Through negotiation--rather than competition--we had an opportunity to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the USSR and to seek--over time--to create a situation in which both sides could use more of their resources for purposes other than building more strategic weapons.

IV

After thorough preparations by the new Administration

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SALT began in November, 1969, in Helsinki. Initially, the talks concentrated on exploration of strategic principles and development of an agenda for future work. The next phases focused on comprehensive proposals. However, problems over definition of strategic systems and over the basis for limitation of such systems made clear that it would be extremely difficult to negotiate a single comprehensive agreement. The Soviets then pressed for an initial agreement limiting only ABMs. We believed that such an agreement would not make as great a contribution to stability as limitations on both offensive and defensive strategic systems, and that, indeed, such an agreement could be destabilizing.

This impasse was resolved by the breakthrough announced by the President on May 20, 1971. The two Governments agreed to work out arrangements limiting deployment of ABMs, and at the same time conclude certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

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After the May 20 understanding, the principal issu
were how broad a coverage of offensive forces could be
agreed, and how to frame in concrete terms an agreemen
in principle to limit ABMs to a low level. These gene
questions contained numerous and complex specific issu
which took another year of hard negotiating to work ou
The two agreements before you are the successful resul
of that work.

V

Mr. Chairman, a detailed analysis of the two agre
ments was made in my letter of submittal to the Presid
I believe it would be helpful this morning to consider
what these agreements would do. I will
touch on certain of their most important provisions.
Following my statement, Ambassador Smith is prepared t
join me in answering questions you may have.

Let me say as a preface to this discussion that
both agreements the US has sought, where necessary, t
forth detailed obligations in the texts of the agreem

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themselves. Where one of the sides preferred to put clarifying material or elaboration in Agreed Interpretati and where this was sufficient, that approach was sometime used. These Agreed Interpretations have been transmitted to the Congress; they include initialled statements and o common understandings. In certain cases where agreement could not be reached, US views were stated formally in unilateral statements. Those, too, have been transmit to the Congress. There are no secret agreements.

I would like to address first the ABM Treaty.

Under this Treaty, both sides make a commitment not to build a nationwide ABM defense. This is a general undertaking of utmost significance. Both great nuclear powers have recognized, and agreed to maintain, a situati where mutual deterrence has replaced unilateral defense a ~~our main reliance. Both powers have agreed to prohibit a potential threat to strategic ballistic missile retaliato forces.~~ Without a nationwide ABM defense, there can be n shield against retaliation. ~~The~~ penetration capability of surviving missile forces is assured.

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I am convinced that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this Treaty.

A major objective of SALT has been to reduce the tensions, uncertainties and high costs which flow from the upward spiral of strategic arms competition. While the cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially, over the long term we will save the te of billions of dollars which would otherwise have been sp on a nationwide ABM defense. Further, by holding Soviet ABM deployment to low levels, we will be able to avoid -- over the long term -- very large expenditures for new ~~offensive weapon systems~~ which would otherwise have been needed to counter ~~probable~~ widespread Soviet ABM deployme There will be a break in the pattern of action and reacti under which each side reacts to what the other is doing, may do, in an open-ended situation. This cycle until now has been a major factor in driving the strategic arms rac

The heart of the Treaty is Article III, which spells out the provisions under which each of the parties may

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deploy two limited ABM complexes, one in an ICBM deployment area, and one at its national capital. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 associated interceptors, at each complex -- a total of 200.

The two ABM deployment complexes permitted each side will serve different purposes. The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM deployment area will afford some protection for ICBMs in the area. ABM coverage at the national capitals will permit protection for the National Command Authority against a light attack, or an accidental or unauthorized launch of a limited number of missiles, and thus decrease the chances that such an event would trigger a nuclear exchange. In addition, it will buy some time against a major attack, and its radars would help to provide valuable warning.

ABM radars are strictly limited. There are also important limitations on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars. The complex subject of radar control was a central question in the negotiations because radars are the long lead-time item in development of an ABM system.

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The Treaty provides for other important qualitati limitations. The parties will undertake not to develo test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. T have also agreed not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify la to provide them with such a capability; nor to develop test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other s systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers--or missiles than one independently guided warhead.

Perhaps of even greater importance as a qualitati limitation is that the parties have agreed that future types of ABM systems depending on such devices as lase or particle accelerators may not be deployed, even in permitted areas. Development and testing of such device for fixed land-based systems is not prohibited.

One of the more important corollary provisions de with the problem of upgrading anti-aircraft systems, what has been called the "SAM-upgrade" problem. The conversion or testing of other systems--such as air- or early-warning systems-- defense systems or components thereof, to perform an

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role is prohibited as part of a general undertaking no to provide an ABM capability to non-ABM systems.

The undertakings in the ABM Treaty, as in the Interim Agreement, have been devised so as to assure t they can be verified by national technical means of verification. For the types of arms control measures these agreements, modern national technical means of verification are the most practical and a fully effective assurance of compliance. The Treaty also contains the very important landmark commitments not to interfere with each side's national technical means of verification and not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede the effectiveness of these means.

The Treaty contains another significant "first" in Soviet-American arms control. A Standing Consultat Commission will, on a regular basis, consider the oper of the Treaty as well as questions of compliance. The Commission will also have the function of considering

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proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. It will assure that even after the completion of the follow-on negotiations there will be a continui strategic dialogue between the two powers.

The duration of the ABM Treaty is unlimited. But it contains a withdrawal clause of the kind which has characterized post-war arms control agreements. Each party can withdraw if it decides that extraordinary ev relating to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeop dized its supreme interests. Notice of such a decisio including a statement of the extraordinary events invo must be given six months prior to withdrawal.

The interrelationship between limitations on offe sive and defensive strategic arms which the US has repeatedly stressed is reflected in the expressed int to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic arms. As was pointed out in my submittal l the special importance attached by the United States this relationship was set forth in a formal statement

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Ambassador Smith recording the position of the United States Government that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years US supreme interests could be jeopardized, and should that occur it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the Treaty. I believe that this withdrawal right, which is exercisable on our judgment alone, fully protects our security interests in the event that the follow-on negotiations were not to succeed and that the strategic situation became such that we felt obliged to exercise it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.

This Agreement freezes at approximately current levels the aggregate number of ~~ICBM and~~ (SLBM) launchers operational and under construction on each side for up to five years. We hope that it will be replaced well before that time by a more complete agreement in treaty form covering strategic offensive weapons.

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Under the Agreement, in Articles I and II, the part undertake a commitment not to construct additional fixe ICBM launchers and not to convert launchers for light or older ICBMs into launchers for modern heavy ICBMs. This undertaking by the Soviet Union should be viewed in term of the concern in this country during the past several years about the continued buildup in numbers of Soviet ICBMs, particularly the heavy SS-9 ICBMs. The growth in numbers of both light and heavy Soviet ICBM launchers ha now been stopped.

The ~~Soviets did~~ not specify ~~to us~~ the number of ICB ~~which they had~~ operational or under construction when th Agreement was signed. We have made it abundantly clear ~~them~~, however, that we consider this number to be 1618. Specifying the number of ICBMs in the Agreement is not important, since national means of verification will rev if any new ICBM construction, which is prohibited by the Agreement, were to take place.

Article III and the Protocol limit SLBM launchers a modern ballistic missile submarines. The agreement cont undertakings not to build such launchers and submarines above a given number.

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A total of 62 modern submarines has been set as a ceiling for the USSR on the number of operational modern submarines (that is, Y-class nuclear-powered submarines). A total of 950 missiles is the ceiling for the USSR on SLBMs on nuclear submarines plus modern SLBMs (that is, or SS-N-8) operationally deployed on the older submarines (that is, G-class diesel-powered submarines).

In effect, the Agreement freezes SLBM launchers at present levels, except that additional SLBM launchers can be built, provided that they replace older strategic launchers on a one-for-one basis.

The Soviets may have no more than 740 SLBM launchers nuclear submarines of any type, operational and under construction, unless they replace them in accordance with agreed procedures. The purpose of the figure 740 is to establish a clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids uncertainty or debate over the meaning of "under construc

To reach 950 SLBMs on modern submarines, the USSR m retire older ballistic missile systems -- specifically, the SS-7 and 8 ICBMs and H-class SLBMs. The first SLBM launcher on a nuclear submarine after launcher 740 must be a replacement. The older ICBM or SLBM launchers bein

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replaced will be dismantled beginning no later than the date on which the submarine containing the 741st launcher begins sea trials.

I might add that this one-way ~~ix~~ concept -- permit replacement of land-based launchers with submarine-based launchers -- was first suggested by the US early in SALT as a way of achieving greater strategic stability.

The USSR could retain the existing older SLBMs on G-submarines, in addition to 950 SLBM launchers on modern submarines. However, any launchers for modern SLBMs on these older ~~non-nuclear~~ submarines would be included in the 950 ceiling.

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The modernization and replacement provisions of
Interim Agreement will permit both sides to improve t
missile forces, but the restrictions on converting la
for light ICBMs or older heavy ICBMs to launchers for
modern heavy ICBMs will place important qualitative
restrictions on Soviet programs. The conversion of c
rent US ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missi
and the conversion of current Polaris submarines to
Poseidon missiles, as well as the construction of n
submarines as replacement for older ones, will not b
prohibited.

The A ment provides for application of the s
verification procedures and commitments about non-
concealment and non-interference as contained in the
Treaty. The Standing Consultative Commission will a
be used to promote the objectives and the implementa
of the Interim Agreement.

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There is a commitment to continue active negotiat for more complete limitations on strategic offensive a The Agreement also stipulates that its terms will not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on st tegic offensive arms which may be worked out in the fo on negotiations.

The offensive arms limitations are temporary and not comprehensive. They do not cover all strategic de vehicles. For example, strategic bombers and their armaments such as missiles, where the US already has a very large advantage, are not limited by the Interim Agreement.

The Interim Agreement does not limit on-going US offensive arms programs. It does stop the Soviet Unio from increasing the number of its strategic offensiv missile launchers. These limitations on Soviet strate offensive forces, in conjunction with very low limits ABMs on both sides, clearly advance US security intere

Looked at overall, our forces are clearly suffici to protect our, and our Allies', security interests.

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US strategic forces are qualitatively superior and more effective than Soviet strategic forces. The USSR has more missile launchers. The US has more missile warheads. We have many more strategic bombers. Moreover, numbers alone are not an illuminating or useful measure for judging the strategic balance.

-VI-

With these two agreements, we should have a more secure and stable strategic relationship with the USSR.

Both sides gain assurance that their strategic missile deterrent forces will not be rendered ineffective by the other's ABM system.

But even with the advantages that these two agreements will bring, we must keep our strategic forces up-to-date if these are to continue their central role for deterrence. Our forces must be adequate to deter attack on--or coercion of--the US and its Allies. The relationship between US

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and Soviet strategic forces must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital interests and those of our Allies will not be underestimated by anyone. I am sure the Congress agrees.

~~V~~ VII

Mr. Chairman, I have presented an overview of the basic undertakings of these agreements and of their significance.

I think it wrong to ask who "won" or "lost" the initial SALT negotiations. In matters involving the central security interests of two great powers, any arms limitation agreement must respond to each side's interest or it will not last very long. Both sides must gain from SALT or neither does.

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These agreements constitute not an end of the process of curbing strategic arms but rather what is perhaps the most difficult part of that process--making a significant beginning. With these two agreements we enter a new era in arms control and what may have been difficult or impossible in the past may now be attainable. It should now be easier for both sides to agree to additional limitations, including reductions.

The security of the United States will be strengthened by these two agreements.

They will make possible a more rational and stable strategic relationship.

They should help to improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order.

They will reduce the threat of nuclear war.

They will give to the world greater hope for the future.

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Mr. Chairman, I urge that this Committee and the Senate support the ABM Treaty and its accompanying Interi Agreement.

Thank you.

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